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CONFUSION AND SOLUTION: CHAPTER 11 BANKRUPTCY
TRUSTEE'S STANDARD OF CARE FOR PERSONAL
LIABILITY
In Chapter 11 of the Bankruptcy Code,1 a debtor is given a
chance to reorganize his troubled estate rather than to liquidate
it outright. Normally, the debtor remains in possession of the
assets of the estate and continues to operate the business.2 In
extraordinary situations, however, the court must appoint a trustee
to take over the duties of the debtor and run the estate.' The
trustee is guided by the duties enumerated in the Code, but,
unfortunately, one duty was not specifically spelled out: the
personal liability standard for trustees.
The National Bankruptcy Review Commission (NBRC)4 recently
recommended that the Code define this standard of care. This
particular recommendation has been influential. As Brady
Williamson stated:
Perhaps the most tangiblejurisprudential effect of the [National
Bankruptcy Review] Commission's work to date has come in
cases involving the liability of trustees. The Bankruptcy Code...
does not provide a personal liability standard, and a long line of
court decisions has led to varying conclusions-requiring a
standard of care ranging from simple negligence to virtual
immunity. The Commission recommended a "gross negligence"
standard that balanced too little protection (and the resulting
disincentive to serve) with too much protection (and the
resulting disincentive to care). [In May 2000], the U.S. Court of
1. 11 U.S.C. passim (2000).
2. See 7 COLLIER ON BANKRUPrcY § 1104.02 (Lawrence P. King et al. eds., 15th ed.

2000).
3. See id.

4. The NBRC is a commission formed by the Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1994, Pub. L.
No. 103-394,108 Stat. 4106 (1994), whose purpose is to study and investigate issues related
to the bankruptcy system and devise proposals to deal with these issues. For detailed
analysis of the proposal relating to personal liability for trustees see infra notes 115-134 and
accompanying text.
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adopted

the

Mr. Williamson, former chairman of the NBRC, was referring to the
recent case of Dodson v. Huff (In re Smyth)6 where the Fifth Circuit
Court ofAppeals held that a Chapter 11 bankruptcy trustee should
not be subjected to personal liability for damages to the bankruptcy
estate unless the trustee acted grossly negligent in performance of
their duties.7 What is most curious about the above quotation,
particularly because it was delivered by the former chairman ofthe
NBRC, is that the court in Dodson did not explicitly follow the
Commission's recommendations. In fact, Huff was appointed as a
Chapter 11 trustee,' and according to the proposal adopted by the
NRBC, a Chapter 11 trustee ought to be personally liable for
damages to the bankruptcy estate if they breach "the standard of
care applicable to officers and directors of a corporation in the state
in which the Chapter 11 case is pending."9 As will be shown later in
this Note, the Fifth Circuit clearly rejected the recommendation of
the NBRC in relation to Chapter 11 trustees, and decided that the
standard of gross negligence that the NRBC suggested for Chapter
7 trustees will suffice.
Confusion has always surrounded the standard of care for
bankruptcy trustees.' This Note will attempt to explain the source
of this confusion among the courts, stemming from a misreading of
one Supreme Court decision, and ultimately provide a solution that
differs from both the Fifth Circuit and the NBRC recommendations.
Specifically, the first section describes the trustee duties that are
delineated by the Bankruptcy Code. The next section outlines the
confusion of the courts, beginning with a misunderstanding of the
"willful and deliberate" standard of Mosser v. Darrow" and leading
5. Brady C. Williamson, Remarks from Views from the Bench (Sept. 15, 2000), at
http://www.abiworld.orglreform/bradytalk.html.
6. 207 F.3d 758 (5th Cir. 2000).
7. Id. at 762.
8. Id. at 760.
9. NATIONAL BANKE. REV. COMmIN FINAL REPORT § 3.3.2, reprintedin 1 BANKRuprcY:
THENExTTwENTYYEAS,NAVLBANKR. REV. COMM1NFiNALREPORT, at 858 (William S. Hein
& Co. 2000) (1997) [hereinafter NATL BANKR. REV. COMmN FINAL REPORT].
10. See infra notes 56-114 and accompanying text.
11. 341 U.S. 267 (1951).
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to the "gross negligence" standard as spelled out in the recent
Dodson v. Huff case. The third section analyzes and criticizes the
recommendations of the NBRC. Finally, the last section proposes
that Chapter 11 trustees have a national, uniform standard of care
that is akin to the standard of care for corporate directors.
THE BANKRUPTCY CODE AND ENUMERATED DUTIES OF A TRUSTEE
Before delving into the Code's lack of specificity about the
personal liability standard for Chapter 11 trustees, it is important
to know what duties the Code actually delineates. "Section 1106(a)
[of the Code] specifies six duties of a trustee in a reorganization
case and incorporates by reference five duties of a trustee in a
liquidation case. " Me five duties imposed on Chapter 7 trustees,
applying also to Chapter 11 trustees, are that the trustee shall: (i)
be accountable for all property received;"3 (ii) examine and object to
proofs of claims; 4 (iii) furnish information about the estate and its
administration upon request of a party in interest; 5 (iv) file any
required reports or summaries of the operations of the business to
the court or governmental unit; 6 and (v) make and file a final
report and account of the estate with the court.' It is clear that
these common duties require both Chapter 7 and Chapter 11
trustees to examine the estate with which they are entrusted and
to disclose information about it to the appropriate entities.
In addition to these five trustee duties common between Chapter
7 and 11, the Chapter 11 trustee must meet six duties specific to
Chapter 11. The trustee must further disclose a list of creditors, a
schedule of assets and liabilities, a schedule of income and
expenditures, and a statement of the financial affairs of the
debtor.' 8 Unless the court orders otherwise, the trustee must
investigate all of the operations of the debtor and the debtor's
business. 9 As soon as practicable after this examination of the
12.
13.
14.
15.
16.

7 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY, supranote 2, § 1106.02.
11 U.S.C. § 704(2) (2000).
Id. § 704(5).
Id. § 704(7).
Id. § 704(8).

17. Id. § 704(9).

18. Id. § 1106(a)(2) (cross-referencing the duties delineated in 11 U.S.C. § 521(1)).
19. Id. § 1106(aX3).
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debtor, the trustee must disclose and file, with the court and
appropriate creditors, any findings of "fraud, dishonesty, incompetence, misconduct, mismanagement, or irregularity in the
management of the affairs of the debtor." 20 Thus, the Code forces
not only disclosure from the trustee, but also an affirmative duty of
investigation of the debtor's activities. In line with the purpose
of Chapter 11, a plan for reorganization or recommendations for
conversion to another Code chapter should be made by the trustee
"as soon as practicable."2 ' Finally, the trustee is given limited
immunity ("without personal liability") to provide information, if
there is any available, to the appropriate governmental agency for
missing tax information that the estate failed to file. 2
There are other important Code duties that apply to this
trustee. He is the representative of the estate, and as such, has
the "capacity to sue and be sued."23 Taxes must be appropriately
filed.24 In addition to his own disinterested25 fiduciary duties,
he must employ only disinterested professionals to help him in
administration of the estate.2 Finally, in the duty most important
to the Chapter 11 trustee, "the trustee may operate the debtor's
business."27 The Code does not delineate the standard of care, but
court decisions have applied the duties of corporate directors to this
situation.28
The duties enumerated by the Code "support the notion of a
trustee as an independent third party whose role is to represent the
20. Id. § 1106(aX4).
21. Id. § 1106(aX5).
22. Id. § 1106(a)(6).
23. Id. § 323(a),(b).
24. Id. §§ 346(b), 505.
25. Id. § 101(14)(E) (defining "disinterested person" as someone who "does not have an
interest materially adverse to the interest of the estate or of any class of creditors or equity
security holders, by reason of any direct or indirect relationship to ... the debtor, or... for

any other reason").
26. Id. § 327. For an example of a court holding a trustee personally liable for the actions
of their disinterested agents, see infra notes 32-55 and accompanying text.
27. Id. § 1108; see also 7 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY, supra note 2, § 1106.03(1)(d)
("Although section 1108 is... not mandatory, the trustee is nonetheless under an affirmative
duty to operate the business if such operation is necessary to preserve the value of the
estate.").
28. See, e.g., Ford Motor Credit Co. v. Weaver, 680 F.2d 451, 461 (6th Cir. 1982) ("The
measure ofcare, diligence and skill required of a trustee is that of'an ordinarily prudent man
.... ) (quoting In re Johnson, 518 F.2d 246, 251 (10th Cir. 1977)).
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estate for the benefit of the various parties in interest."29 The result

of this is that the trustee is under a duty to investigate and disclose
the affairs of the estate so that the parties in interest will be able
to protect their interests in the estate. 0 Although the Code never
defines the standard for when the Chapter 11 trustee will become
personally liable for breaching these fiduciary duties, the duties
delineated by the Code echo much the same duties as corporate
31
directors: duty of care, duty of loyalty, and duty of disclosure.
Whereas the duties of loyalty and disclosure are well spelled out by
the Code as shown above, it is the duty of care, and the standard
that goes along with it, that has caused the most problems for the
courts.
MOSSER'S "WILLFUL AND DELIBERATE" STANDARD
The first and only Supreme Court case to address the issue of the
standard of care for a reorganization trustee is Mosser v. Darrow.32
Because this case was decided in 1951, the original Bankruptcy Act
of 1898, not the current Code, governed its decision. Hence, Darrow
was referred to as a "reorganization" trustee rather than a Chapter
11 trustee. The facts of the case are as follows: in 1935, Paul
Darrow was appointed as reorganization trustee for two common
law trusts that functioned as holding companies, with their
principle assets being securities of twenty-seven companies. 3 These
two trusts and subsidiary companies had been promoted by Jacob
Kulp and Myrtle Johnson and, given the financial woes of these
business entities, Darrow thought it necessary to employ them to
assist in the trusteeship.3" Kulp and Johnson were employed with
the express agreement that they could continue to trade in
securities of the debtors' subsidiaries. 5 These two assistants traded
extensively in the bonds of the subsidiary companies, on occasion
acquired bonds for themselves, and then sold them to Darrow at a
29. 7 COLLIER ON BANKRupTcy, supranote 2, § 1106.01.

30. Id.
31. See infra notes 159-64 and accompanying text.
32. 341 U.S. 267 (1951).
33. Id. at 268.

34. Id. at 268-69.
35. I& at 269.
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profit for themselves.3 6 Substantial profits were made unbeknownst
to Darrow. 7 In the eight years of the trusteeship, Darrow filed only
one account for one of the debtor-corporations and none for the
other. 8 At this point, the Securities and Exchange Commission
intervened, and a special master was appointed who, after much
investigation, recommended to surcharge Darrow. 9 Upon this
recommendation, the District Court surcharged the trustee, but on
appeal, the Court of Appeals reversed the decision saying that a
trustee could not be surcharged unless guilty of supine negligence.4"
The Supreme Court reversed the Court of Appeals decision finding
that Darrow should be held personally liable for the indiscrete
actions of Kulp and Johnson."
Writing for the majority, Justice Jackson provided what seemed
to be a clear and narrow ruling. Justice Jackson first noted that the
issue was not that Darrow knowingly allowed Kulp and Johnson to
make a profit by buying and selling securities, because to do so
would definitely result in personal liability for violation of his
fiduciary duties to the estate. Rather, the extent of Darrow's
responsibility for profits gained unawares was the true issue in the
case. 2 The Court explained:
Equity tolerates in bankruptcy trustees no interest adverse to
the trust. This is not because such interests are always corrupt
but because they are always corrupting. By its exclusion of the
36. Id.
37. Id. at 270.
38. Id.
39. Id. By "surcharge" the special master meant to find Darrow personally liable for his
and his employees' actions. According to Black's Law Dictionary, "surcharge" means the
"imposition of personal liability on a fiduciary for willful or negligent misconduct in the
administration of his fiduciary duties." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1441 (6th ed. 1990).
40. Mosser, 341 U.S. at 272 ("It is argued here, and appears to have been the view of the
Court of Appeals, that principles of negligence applied and that a trustee could not be
surcharged under many decisions unless guilty of'supine negligence.'). The terms "supine
negligence" and "gross negligence" are synonymous. See E. Allan Tiller, PersonalLiability
of Trustees andReceivers in Bankruptcy, 53 AM. BANKI. L.J. 75, 96 (noting that"some courts
have emphasized the good faith of the trustee ... and have required a greater degree of
negligence, i.e., 'gross' or 'supine' negligence").
41. Mosser, 341 U.S. at 270.
42. Id. at 271 ("A reorganization trustee is the representative of the court and it is not
contended... that if he had engaged for his own advantage in the same transactions that he
authorized on the part of his subordinates he should not be surcharged.").

20021

CONFUSION AND SOLUTION

1303

trustee from any personal interest, it seeks to avoid such
delicate inquiries as we have here into the conduct of its own
appointees by exacting from them forbearance of all
opportunities to advance self-interest that might bring the
disinterestedness of their administration into question.4 8
There cannot be authorization for others to do what a trustee
himself may not do." The Court of Appeals thought that in this
particular case, the principles of negligence ought to apply and that
the trustee should not be surcharged for any acts of mere
negligence, i.e., not monitoring the actions of his employees."6 The
Supreme Court correctly saw that "[t] he liability here is not created
by a failure to detect defalcations, in which case negligence might
be required to surcharge the trustee, but is a case of willful and
deliberate setting up of an interest in employees adverse to that of
the trust."' A trustee's disregard, whether it be reckless or not, for
the actions of his own employees, is immaterial in this instance.
Darrow willfully and deliberately authorized these transactions by
writing it into the employment contracts.47 "[E] quity... preclud[es]
such transactions for the reason that their effect is often difficult to
trace, and the prohibition is not merely against injuring the
estate-it is against profiting out of the position of trust." 8 Later
court decisions have failed to understand this narrow ruling.'
Rather than leaving future courts with this narrow ruling, the
Court went on, albeit in dicta, to provide some guidance in judging
the duties of a reorganization trustee. First, it is clear that a
trustee, like any principal, is responsible for his employees.50 The
Court implied that there needs to be detailed inquiries into the
operations of employees. 5 Second, the Court understood that
43. Id.
44. Id,
45. Id. at 272.
46. Id.
47. Id. at 267, 272.
48. Id. at 273.
49. See infra notes 56-79 and accompanying text (discussing Tenth, Seventh, and Sixth
Circuit decisions misinterpreting the Mosser holding).
50. The Code codifies this duty. See 11 U.S.C. § 327 (2000).
51. See Mosser, 341 U.S. at 272 ("The question whether he was negligent in not making
detailed inquiries into their operations is unimportant, because he had given a blanket
authority for the operations.").
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trustees by reason of sanction may become fearful of making
business judgments if these decisions can later be "open to serious
criticism by obstreperous creditors aided by hindsight."5 2 The Court
remarked that "[c] ourts are quite likely to protect trustees against
heavy liabilities for disinterested mistakes in business judgment." 8
It appears that the Court would approve of judicial protection for
trustees, much in the same way it does for corporate directors,
by employing the business judgement rule.5 4 Finally, the Court
implied that disclosure will limit, if not foreclose, personal liability
for the trustee. This disclosure can be in the form of requests for
instruction from the court on "difficult questions of judgment," or
regular accounting of the business given to the court and parties in
interest.5 5
On careful examination, Mosser should have provided great
guidance for later courts. The Court stated that willful and deliberative acts of the trustee or his employees against the interest of
the trust will incur personal liability. The Court implied that when
disinterested trustees have made mistakes, courts are likely to
employ the business judgment rule to protect them from merely
negligent actions. The trustee can utilize the business judgment
rule to limit or avoid personal liability by prompt disclosure of
the accounts of the business and by seeking instruction from the
court when making very difficult judgments. Unfortunately, the
Tenth Circuit, and the courts that followed their decision, failed to
correctly interpret Mosser. This has led to unnecessary confusion.

52. Id. at 273-74.
53. Id. at 274.
54. The business judgment rule is a common law principle that protects corporate
directors from personal liability for any mistakes made in the course of the business so long

as the decision was made in good faith and in the best interest of the business, from the
perspective of an ordinarily prudent person. See, e.g., Smith v. Van Gorkom, 488 A.2d 858,

872 (Del. 1985) (stating that where there is no evidence of bad faith, directors will not be
liable for mistaken judgment unless having acted in an uninformed and reckless manner).
55. Mosser, 341 U.S. at 274.
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MISCONSTRUING MOSSER

In Sherr v. Winkler,5" the plaintiffs brought a tort action for
conversion against Winkler, the reorganization trustee5 7 of the
Sierra Company. In the course of his duties, Winkler had obtained
a Turnover Order from the court which brought the funds of certain
gas and oil interests to the trust. Unbeknownst to Winkler, the
Sherrs had an interest in these leases and thus were prevented by
the court order from realizing these funds. 8 According to the court,
"[i]t is uncontradicted that Winkler did not check for any recorded
interests ... prior to the Reorganization Court Turnover Order
hearing... ."" Nevertheless, the trial court found that Winkler had
not violated any of his fiduciary duties; he had acted in good faith
and "no personal liability can be imposed in respect to his 6efforts,
0
which were not a sham, evil or without legal justification."
The Tenth Circuit agreed with the trial court's conclusion that
Winkler did not violate his fiduciary duties, but the court's
reasoning is as confusing as it is unhelpful. The court first noted
that "[a] trustee appointed and serving in a reorganization
proceeding is a fiduciary who has an obligation to treat all parties
fairly. The standard applicable to the surcharge of a bankruptcy
trustee is negligence.""' The court then seemingly backed off from
this mere negligence standard to a more generous negligence
standard, stating that the question of personal liability of a trustee
from loss resulting from negligence is essentially one of good faith,
and that "acts of the fiduciary are to be treated with indulgence and
mistaken judgment is not enough to impose liability.""2
Then, inexplicably, the court opined:
Mosser v. Darrowestablished the rules that a trustee or receiver
in bankruptcy is (a) not liable, in any manner, for mistake in
56. 552 F.2d 1367 (10th Cir. 1977)

57. As with Mosser, Sherr was decided before the adoption of the Code, and therefore,
Winkler is known as a reorganization trustee.
58. Sherr, 552 F.2d at 1369.
59. Id.

60. Id. at 1371.
61. Id. at 1374 (citations omitted) (citingMosseru. Darrow, 341 U.S. 267 (1951), without
specific pinpoint, for support that negligence is the applicable standard).
62. Id. at 1375 (citingKaufman v. Kaufman, 166 S.W.2d 860 (Ky. Ct. App. 1942)).
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judgment where discretion is allowed, (b) liable personally only
for acts determined to be willful and deliberate in violation of
his duties and (c) liable, in his official capacity, for acts of
negligence.65
In no way did -theMosser decision establish these three rules. 4 As
stated previously, Mosser merely held that a trustee may be held
personally liable when willfully and deliberately acting against the
trust.65 Certainly, Mosser established no distinctions between a
trustee in an official capacity versus at other times. Furthermore,
the Tenth Circuit failed to grasp that the plaintiffs in Sherr were
not beneficiaries of the estate, so that a trustee would in fact owe
no fiduciary obligations to them. Thus the trustee can be sued in his
official capacity (i.e., as a representative of the estate) but the
monies would come from the estate itself, unless the trustee acted
outside the scope of his authority.6 6
Unfortunately, the confusion of Mosser by the Sherr court went
unnoticed by the Seventh and Sixth Circuits. In the case of In re
Chicago Pacific Corp.,"7 the Seventh Circuit reaffirmed the Sherr
decision by claiming that "[a] trustee may be held personally liable
only for a willful and deliberate violation of his fiduciary duties.""
In one sense, this court, unlike the Tenth Circuit, understood the
difference between the trustee's fiduciary duties to parties in
interest and to third parties to which there are no fiduciary duties
owed. In ChicagoPacific, minority vendors who had brought a class
action against several railroads sought proof of claim against a
debtor railroad in a reorganization meeting. 9 Due to various
procedural difficulties, the proof of claim was rejected.70 Because
this claim was rejected, the court correctly deduced that the trustee
owed no fiduciary duties to these minority vendors. 71 Unfortunately,
63. Id. (citation omitted).
64. See supra notes 32-55 and accompanying text.
65. Mosser, 341 US. at 272.
66. See infra notes 135-58 and accompanying text (discussing Daniel Bogart's criticism
of the NBRC's recommendations).
67. 773 F.2d 909 (7th Cir. 1985).
68. Id. at 915 (citing Mosser and Sherr in support of this standard).
69. Id. at 910.
70. Id. at 912-13.
71. Id. at 915 ("Our examination of the complaint ... reveals not even the slightest
indiction that the Trustee was sued in his personal capacity. Indeed, we think it safe to say
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the court accepted without any further discussion that Mosser
required a willful breach for the trustee to be held personally liable.
In Ford Motor Credit Co. v. Weaver,7 2 the Sixth Circuit
perpetuated the Sherr misunderstanding. Weaver was appointed
the debtor in possession7 3 of Weaver Farms, a business which had
filed for Chapter 11 protection. Due to an incorrect address, Ford
Motor Credit Co. (FMCC) was not able to claim an interest on
equipment that it had lent to Weaver farms. FMCC sued and,
among other claims, stated that Weaver "willfully and deliberately
violated his fiduciary duties as debtor in possession by failing to
safeguard the assets of Weaver Farms.""' The Sixth Circuit
responded:
A trustee in bankruptcy may be liable for violations of his
fiduciary duties. A trustee in bankruptcy can be liable in his
official capacity or individually. A bankruptcy trustee is liable
in his official capacity for acts of negligence ... personally only
for acts willfully and deliberately in violation of his fiduciary
duties.7 5
The court remanded this case to determine whether Weaver had
acted either negligently in his official capacity, or willfully and
deliberately in his personal capacity, 76 neither of which are found
in the language of Mosser at all. 7
This distinction between official capacity and personal capacity
has been completely misunderstood by these circuit courts. Official
capacity exists when the trustee is sued as the representative of the
estate. The estate pays for any damages, unless the trustee acted
outside the scope of his authority. This occurs most frequently
when a third party nonbeneficiary sues the trustee as representative of the estate. The trustees, who have no fiduciary duties
that the Trustee's fiduciary duties did not extend beyond the ... existent creditors and
shareholders.").
72. 680 F.2d 451 (6th Cir. 1982).
73. Id. at 462 ("The principles governing the liability of a bankruptcy trustee are
applicable to a debtor in possession.").
74. Id. at 461.
75. Id. at 461-62 (citing Mosserv. Darrow, 341 U.S. 267 (1951) and Sherrv. Winkler, 552
F.2d 1367 (10th Cir. 1977)).
76. Id. at 462.
77. See supra notes 46-48 and accompanying text.
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to these third parties, should be insulated by a derived judicial
immunity, provided they were within the scope of their authority. 8
The circuit courts claim that negligence is the standard applicable
for this situation. To charge a trustee with this low standard while
they are trying to reorganize a business, however, would have a
chilling effect on those who may decide to assume the tasks of a
trustee.79
NEGLIGENCE AS THE STANDARD OF CARE

The Ninth Circuit departed from the Tenth," Seventh,8 ' and
Sixth 2 Circuits' interpretations of Mosser in Hall v. Perry (In re
Cochise College Park, Inc.). 3 In this case, a class of beneficiaries
sued Perry, the trustee, for breach of his fiduciary duties, claiming
that Perry withheld payments on promissory notes that they
owned and that he made actionable misrepresentations on certain
contracts concerning land deals.84 The trial court granted summary
judgment for the trustee on these issues, but the Court of Appeals
reversed, deciding that there were indeed genuine issues of fact to
be decided by the trial court.85 More specifically, the beneficiaries
argued that for any payments not covered by the estate's assets, the
trustee should be held personally liable.8 6 The beneficiaries
reasoned that the trustee induced them, by misrepresentations, to
continue to make payments on promissory notes even though he
knew that reorganization of this business was impossible.8 7 The
78. See, e.g., Schechter v. Illinois Dep't ofRevenue (In re Markos Gurnee P'ship), 182 B.R.
211, 220 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. 1995) ("The general personal immunity of bankruptcy
trustees-which applies to claims other than for breach of bankruptcy-related fiduciary
duties, arising out of the operation of the estate-renders the estate rather than the trustee
liable .... ").

79. See, e.g., Tennsco Corp. v. Estley Metal Prods., Inc., 200 B.R. 542, 545 (D.N.J. 1996)
(noting "there is a strong public policy in protecting bankruptcy trustees, since the imposition
of personal liability ... for unintentional tortious acts to non-parties to the bankruptcy
proceeding would create a significant disincentive to trustee service").
80. Sherr v. Winkler, 552 F.2d 1367, 1375 (10th Cir. 1977).
81. In re Chicago Pacific Corp., 773 F.2d 909, 915 (7th Cir. 1985).
82. Ford Motor Credit Co. v. Weaver, 680 F.2d 451, 461 (6th Cir. 1982).
83. 703 F.2d 1339 (9th Cir. 1983).
84. Id. at 1346-47.
85. Id.
86. Id. at 1357.
87. Id.
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Ninth Circuit correctly divided the case into two issues, the duty
owed to the creditors for not rejecting executory contracts in a
timely fashion and the duty owed for making misrepresentations. 8
As to the first issue, the Ninth Circuit laid out the correct
foundation that "[a] bankruptcy or reorganization trustee is a
fiduciary of each creditor .... As such, he has a duty to treat all

creditors fairly and to exercise that measure of care and diligence
that an ordinarily prudent person under similar circumstances
would exercise." 9 Then, in an important footnote, this court
rejected the Tenth and Sixth Circuits' "apparent misreading" of
Mosser and decided that "[a]lthough a trustee is not liable in any
manner for mistakes injudgment where discretion is allowed, he is
subject to personal liability for not only intentional but also
negligent violation of duties imposed upon him by law."0 According
to the court, Mosser is properly construed to mean that "the sort of
personal liability which may be imposed on a trustee for the acts of
his employees is not strict liability but rather liability depending at
least on a showing of the trustee's own negligence." 9' Whereas this
interpretation is correct in that the Supreme Court only decided
that willful and deliberate acts will make a trustee personally
liable,92 the Mosser decision did not weigh in on what standard of
negligence is needed. Indeed, the court specifically avoided this
question altogether.9" Nevertheless, the Ninth Circuit held that
negligence is the standard where there is a breach of the duty of
care.
More importantly, the Ninth Circuit overturned the trial court's
determination that misstatements to beneficiaries, unless willful
and deliberate, are not actionable because the trustee's communications are protected by the Bankruptcy Act. 94 This is plainly
88. Id. at 1357-58.
89. Id. at 1357 (citations omitted).
90. Id. at 1357 & n.26 (citations omitted) (citingMosser in support).
91. Id. at 1357 n.26.
92. See Mosser v. Darrow, 341 U.S. 267, 272 (1951).
93. See id. (declining to answer where acts of supine negligence are necessary for
surcharging the trustee).
94. Note that the proceedings in this case were begun before the adoption of the Code.
The Bankruptcy Act shielded the trustee from liability for "a 'communication' to a creditor
... where the communication is uttered 'in good faith and with reasonable grounds for belief
in its truth.'"HHall, 703 F.2d at 1359 (quoting from the BankruptcyAct § 21i, 11 U.S.C. § 44(i)
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false because the fiduciary duty of care requires, at the very least,
one to act in good faith.9 5 An intentional misstatement would not be
acting in good faith under any reasonable construction of good
faith.96 Thus the Ninth Circuit was correct in that Mosser had been
misunderstood by the other circuits, but it failed to provide any
reasoning for applying a negligence rather than gross negligence
standard. Given the danger of creating disincentives for trustees to
taIe up positions in bankruptcy reorganization cases, mere
negligence may not be the right answer.
THE MIDDLE ROAD: GROSS NEGLIGENCE
In its cogent analysis, a Massachusetts bankruptcy court decided
that gross negligence ought to be the standard of care for a Chapter
11 bankruptcy trustee. In DiStefano v. Stern (In re J.F.D.
Enterprises, Inc.),9 the plaintiffs sued the trustee for breaching
his fiduciary duties based on his mismanagement and failure to
preserve the assets of the estate.9 8
After determining whether the plaintiffs had standing to sue, the
court turned to the issue of the standard of care for a trustee.9 9 The
issue of the personal liability of bankruptcy trustees arises in two
contexts: (a) acts or omissions of the trustee in operating the
debtor's business ... which cause[s] injury to the plaintiff(s), and (b)
the trustee's violation of his or her fiduciary duties to the estate, the
creditors, or the shareholders.""0 The court determined that there
is no question that a trustee enjoys judicial immunity whenever he
acts within the scope of his duties under a "properly noticed court
order." 1 After analyzing Mosser, the court noted that "[Mosser]
makes clear that trustees are personally liable for willful, or
(1976)).
95. See Smith v. Van Gorkom, 488 A.2d 858, 872 (Del. 1985).
96. As fraud is intentional, a negligence standard would not even apply. See BLACK'S,
supra note 39, at 660.
97. 223 B.R. 610 (Bankr. D. Mass. 1998), affd, 236 B.R. 112 (D. Mass. 1999), affd, 215
F.3d 1312 (1st Cir. 2000).
98. Id. at 617-19.
99. Id. at 624-25 ("Far more complicated is the standard of care owed by Stern as
trustee, and to that morass the Court now turns.").
100. Id. at 625.
101. Id.
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intentional, violations of their fiduciary duties. However, the
question of whether a less than intentional violation of a fiduciary
duty will subject
a trustee to personal liability has divided the
02
Circuits."1
After citing Sherr,0 3 and Hall,'°4 this court dismissed the willful
and deliberate standard as not applicable,0 5 and the negligence
standard as insufficient, in favor of a gross negligence standard."6
When the bankruptcy trustee enters the reorganization process, he
is bombarded with numerous problems. For example, the trustee
generally has little prior knowledge of the business he has been
appointed to oversee, the debtor usually resents someone else
taking over the stewardship of his business, secured creditors are
made statutorily adversarial to the trustee, and unsecured creditors
are unhappy that their recovery is diluted by the trustee's
involvement and compensation. 1 7 Given this precarious situation,
the court held that "trustees should not be deemed to have violated
their fiduciary duty and become subject to personal liability unless
they are found to have acted with gross negligence."0" According to
the court, this standard "strikes the proper balance between the
difficulties of the task assumed by trustees and the need to protect
the interest of creditors and other parties in the bankruptcy
10 9
case."
Agreeing with the logic of this decision, the Fifth Circuit similarly
held that "trustees should not be subjected to personal liability
102. Id. at 625-26 (citations omitted).
103. 552 F.2d 1367 (10th Cir. 1977).
104. 703 F.2d 1339 (9th Cir. 1983).
105. DiStefano, 223 B.R. at 626 ("It appears to this Court that the holding of Mosser
cannot be extended any further than the proposition that trustees are personally liable for
intentional violations of their fiduciary duties.").
106. Id. at 627-28.
Further, those courts which apply a simple negligence standard to the acts of
a trustee underestimate the role of a trustee under the Bankruptcy Code and
the difficulty associatedwith atrustee's duties.... [Tirustees take on enormous
responsibilities. Yet, trustees are sent into the fray without the most basic of
protections, that of sufficient historical knowledge of the debtor's affairs. The
requirement of disinterestedness usually denies the trustee meaningful
advance information with respect to the critical issues in the case.
Id.
107. See id. at 628.
108. Id.
109. Id-
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unless they are found to have acted with gross negligence."" 0 In
Dodson v. Huff, a creditor sued the trustee of the Smyth estate
because of alleged errors in the filing of the estate's tax returns."'
The trial court decided that simple negligence was not enough to
find a trustee personally liable." 2 The Fifth Circuit agreed. Relying
heavily onDiStefano and the recommendations from the NBRC, the
court noticed that there are conflicting policy considerations
between having too little protection, and hence a disincentive to
serve as trustee, and too much protection, which might result in
mismanagement of the estate.'
Gross negligence, as defined by
Black's Law Dictionary,"4 is the proper intermediate standard.
Although gross negligence correctly conforms to the Mosser decision
and achieves policy goals more effectively than either the willful
and deliberate or simple negligence standards, it is not what the
NBRC recommended for Chapter 11 trustees.
THE

NBRC RECOMMENDATIONS

By way of background, Congress created the NBRC in 1994 to
review the entire bankruptcy system. The NBRC was given the
enormous task of devising recommendations to improve the Code,
while at the same time not disturbing the fundamental tenets of
the existing bankruptcy law."' Remarkably, in 1997, the NBRC
submitted its report with over 170 individual recommendations
on time and under budget." 6 These recommendations were
immediately influential on the current debate surrounding the
bankruptcy system."1 The issue of personal liability for trustees
was important enough that the NBRC felt it necessary to make a

110. Dodson v. Huff (In re Smyth), 207 F.3d 758, 762 (5th Cir. 2000).
111. Id. at 760.
112. Id.
113. Id. at 761-62.
114. "The intentional failure to perform a manifest duty in reckless disregard of the
consequences as affecting the life or property of another." BLACK'S, supra note 39, at 1033.
115. NAT'L BANKR. REV. COMM'N FINAL REPORT, supra note 9, Preface, at iv.

116. Id., Preface, at i.
117. See Williamson, supra note 5 ("More than 40 federal courts have cited the
Commission's work. And it's already been discussed in more than 250 law review articles.
Several of the decisions, including two by the U.S. Court of Appeals, have turned on the
Commission's recommendations.").
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recommendation for its improvement in the Code." 8 This recommendation has already influenced the analyses and decisions of
other courts. 119
The NBRC recommendation is fourfold. First, any bankruptcy
trustee has immunity for any acts taken within the scope of their
duties as defined by the Code or any acts ordered by a court
with proper notice given to parties in interest.' Second, Chapter
7, 12, and 13 trustees should only be subject to suit in their
representative or personal capacities for acts done with gross
negligence.1 2 ' Third, Chapter 11 trustees should only be subject to
suit in their representative and personal capacities for acts done in
violation of the standard of care for corporate directors for the state
in which the bankruptcy case is pending. 1 22 Finally, the debtor in
possession should remain subject to suit in exactly the same
manner as in the current law." s

118. See NAT' BANKI. REV. COMM'N FINAL REPORT, supra note 9, § 3.3.2.

119. See, e.g., Dodson v. Huff (In re Smyth), 207 F.3d 758, 761-62 (5th Cir. 2000);
DiStefano v. Stem (Inre J.F.D. Enters., Inc.), 223 B.R. 610, 625-27 (Bankr. D. Mass. 1998),
affd, 236 B.R. 112 (D. Mass. 1999), aft'd 215 F.3d 1312 (1st Cir. 2000).
120. NAT'L BANKR. REVIEW COMN FINAL REPORT, supranote 9, § 3.3.2 states that:
Trustees appointed in cases under Chapter 7, 11, 12 or 13 of the Bankruptcy
Code should not be subject to suit in their individual capacity for acts taken
within the scope of their duties as delineated in the Bankruptcy Code or by
order of the court, as long as the applicable order was issued on notice to
interested parties and there was fifl disclosure to the court.
121. Id. The Code continues:
Chapter 7, 12 and 13 trustees only should be subject to suit in the trustee's
representative capacity and subject to suit in the trustee's personal capacity
only to the extent that the trustee acted with gross negligence in the
performance of the trustee's fiduciary duties. Gross negligence should be
defined as reckless indifference or deliberate disregard of the trustee's fiduciary
duty.
122. Specifically, the Code says:
A Chapter 11 trustee for a corporate debtor only should be subject to suit in the
trustee's representative capacity and subject to suit in the trustees personal
capacity only to the extent that the trustee has violated the standard of care
applicable to officers and directors of a corporation in the state in which the
Chapter 11 case is pending.
Id.
123. Id. ("Debtors in possession should remain subject to suit to the same extent as
currently exists under state or federal law.").
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In its reasoning for these recommendations the NBRC noted:
[Tihe Bankruptcy Code does not provide a personal liability
standard for bankruptcy trustees. Since 1978, the courts that
have addressed this issue have come to contrary conclusions.
Under what has been described as a "crazy quilt" of decisions,
trustees are held to standards of care ranging from personal
liability for negligence to personal liability for willful and
intentional acts in violation of the trustee's duties. Some courts
also find that trustees have derived judicial immunity for acts

taken within the scope of their authority. 24

Given this universe of choices, the report sought a balance "to
protect trustees from personal liability where warranted while
encouraging responsible administration of estate assets."'25 This
need for a balance led the NBRC to decide that any trustee should
be protected when acting within the scope of his duties.126 Astutely,
the NBRC explained that "[olften times, a party that is dissatisfied
with the result of a court order... will attempt to collaterally attack
the order by suing the trustee personally."' 27 Additionally, there
needs to be disclosure to the court and parties in interest. 2 8 This
recommendation squares with the Mosser decision 9 and makes
good sense given the policy goals of the NBRC. 3 0
Outside of acts pursuant to statute or court order, the
recommendation was a gross negligence standard for Chapter 7,
12, and 13 trustees. There was disagreement from the National
Association of Bankruptcy Trustees (NABT) who, not surprisingly,
lobbied to establish the willful and deliberate standard.'13 The
NBRC decided that this standard was too protective and "would not
encourage trustees to seek court approval of difficult estate

124. Id. at 859-60 (citations omitted).
125. Id. at 861.
126. Id. at 862 ("The scope of a trustee's duties includes any action (including an exercise
of business judgment) taken pursuant to statute or court order.").
127. Id.
128. Id. at 862-63.
129. See Mosser v. Darrow, 341 U.S. 267, 272 (1951).
130. See NATL BANKR. REV. COMMN FINAL REPORT, supra note 9, Preface, at i-iv.
131. See id. at 867 (citing that the NABT "recommended a 'wilful and intentional'
standard for personal trustee liability").
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administration decisions."" 2 Unfortunately, the NBRC failed to
give any in-depth explanation for why Chapter 11 trustees should
be treated differently than Chapter 7 or 13 trustees. They merely
mentioned that "[w]hen a trustee is appointed [to] a Chapter 11
case, the trustee acts in place ofthe debtor in possession and should
be subject to the standard of care for officers and directors set forth
by the state where the Chapter 11 case is pending."33 This is an
unsatisfying explanation and one that has been open to criticism. 4
CRITIcISM OF THE NBRC RECOMMENDATIONS

Daniel Bogart clearly delineates the problems with the NBRC's
recommendations. 35 Bogart is not subtle with his criticism about
the NBRC's proposal: "The provision ultimately drafted by the
Commission suggests that the Commission ignored or misunderstood basic legal doctrine. If adopted, the provision would
undermine the doctrinal integrity of the Bankruptcy Code." 36 His
comments are worth investigating not only to understand the
NBRC proposal but also to summarize the current state of the
standard of care argument.
The first criticism that Bogart levies is that the NBRC missed the
opportunity to clarify the case law that relies on the Mosser decision
and instead codified its misunderstanding.3 7 Mosser is a "duty of
loyalty," not a duty of care situation, because this was a case of selfdealing.' 8 The Sherr court misunderstood this distinction and
complicated matters by concluding that negligent actions will never
result in personal liability because only deliberate actions can
produce this result.3 9 According to Sherr, a negligent action will
subject the trustee only to official liability-meaning that the estate
will pay for the indiscretion. 40 As Bogart suggests, this is
132. Id.
133. Id. at 869.
134. See, e.g., infra note 153 and accompanying text.
135. DanielB. Bogart,Findingthe Still Small Voice: The LiabilityofBankruptcy Trustees
and the Work ofthe NationalBankruptcy Review Commission, 102 DICK. L. REV. 703 (1998).
136. Id. at 707.
137. Id. at 711 ("[Mosser] is correct and should be applied and maintained.").
138. Id. at 712.
139. Id. at 713.
140. Id. at 714.
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manifestly wrong because whenever a trustee breaches a fiduciary
duty, whether deliberately or negligently, he should run the risk of
personal liability.''
Furthermore, accordingto Bogart, the Sherr court misapplied the
concept of derived judicial immunity. Whenever a nonbeneficiary
sues a trustee, derived judicial immunity, not fiduciary analysis, is
necessary. 42 The only issue in the Sherr case is whether the trustee
is acting in the scope of his duties; if so, he is immune personally
from liability. 4 ' However, a trustee always has a duty to the parties
in interest. "Trustees are simply not 'immune' from suits brought
by their beneficiaries."'" Unfortunately, courts have confused these
concepts. Bogart offers this advice: "Ilissues of negligence and
disloyalty are all that matters in cases where beneficiaries bring
complaints. Similarly ...one can only be disloyal or incompetent
vis-a-vis persons to whom one owes these duties. ... [This is,
unfortunately, an error that the Commission makes." 4 These
misunderstandings of duty of loyalty versus duty of care and
applications of judicial immunity are reflected in the NBRC's
recommendations.
Turning to the proposal itself, Bogart noted the sloppy use of the
language, as evidenced by the words "representative," "individual,"
and "Personal."'46 It is clear that when the trustee is acting in his
representative capacity, he is immune from suit unless acting
outside the scope of his activities, but the difference between
individual and personal capacity is unclear on its face and could
lead in the future to more misunderstandings by the courts, "a la
Sherr v. Winkler."" This sloppy terminology undermines the NBRC
proposal because the first paragraph provides protection for all
bankruptcy trustees in their individual (personal?) capacities for
acts done in the scope of their duties, but the second paragraph says
that certain bankruptcy trustees are subject to suit in their
representative and personal (individual?) capacities for acts done
141.
142.
143.
144.
145.
146.
147.

Id. at 715 ("A breach is a breach is a breach.").
Id. at 717.
Id.
Id. at 720.
Id. at 723.
See id. at 729-30.
Id.
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with gross negligence. 48 Furthermore, Chapter 11 trustees are held
to the same standard of care as state corporate directors in their
representative and personal capacities.' 49 As Bogart suggests, this
mess of language creates the result that "personal liability would
only arise if such grossly negligent actions were also outside the
scope of the trustee's authority. Thus, the trustee would be
judicially immune from the actions of beneficiaries. " 150 This is
clearly not the result one wants. The NBRC should have made it
clear that with respect to nonbeneficiaries,trustees are judicially
immune for acts within the scope of their duties; and with respect
to beneficiaries,the Chapter 7, 11, or 12 trustees will be personally
liable for actions done with gross negligence.
Furthermore, these duties to beneficiaries are twofold, the duty
of care and the duty ofloyalty. The proposal fails to delineate either
duty. Bogart suggests that "[n]o policy reason... warrants treating
the fiduciary duties of care and loyalty differently for the purpose
of determining a trustee's personal liability."' 5 ' As has been
previously mentioned in this Note, however, and noticed by the
Supreme Court in Mosser, a breach of the duty of loyalty is often
the result of a willful and deliberate act, whereas a breach of the
duty of care may result from simple negligence. 1 52 Thus, each duty
should be analyzed accordingly.
Finally, Bogart correctly admonishes the NBRC for its
recommendation for Chapter 11 trustees. To impose the duties of state
corporate directors on Chapter 11 trustees "would create fifty
different fiduciary standards for Chapter 11 trustees reflecting the
corporate law of the fifty states of the Union."' This result seems
to undermine the purpose of the Code to provide uniform standards
for the country as mandated by the U.S. Constitution. 5 4 In addition
to this lack of uniformity, Bogart asserts that "there are striking
148. See id at 732-33; NAT'L BANKEL REv. COMM'N FINAL REPORT, supranote 9, § 3.3.2.
149. Id.
150. Bogart, supranote 135, at 733.
151. Id. at 714 (quoting Daniel B. Bogart, Liability ofDirectorsof Chapter 11 Debtors in
Possession:"Don'tLook Back, Something May Be Gainingon You", 68 AM. BANKR. L.J. 155,
211 (1994)).
152. See Mosser v. Darrow, 341 U.S. 267,272 (1951).
153. Bogart, supranote 135, at 737.
154. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl.4 ("To establish ... uniform Laws on the subject of
Bankruptcies throughout the United States....").
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differences between a trustee's duty of care and that of a typical
corporate director. Similarly, although the differences may be less
evident, there are real differences between a trustee's duty of
loyalty and those of a corporate fiduciary."' 5 5 According to Bogart,
the bankruptcy courts, although granting wide discretion, typically
require something greater for a trustee than adherence to the
business judgment rule standard.'56 Corporate directors are only
liable for irrational and uninformed mistakes, whereas trustees are
held to a higher standard of reasonable care. Furthermore, state
exculpatory statutes protect corporate directors from any breach of
the duty of care, unlike trustees. 5 ' Moreover, corporate directors
only owe a duty of loyalty to their shareholders, whereas trustees'
loyalties are to shareholders, creditors, and any other party in
interest. Finally, Bogart suggests that as long as the language of
the recommendation is made clear, Chapter 11 trustees, like their
brethren, should be held in their personal capacity to the gross
15 8
negligence standard.
Bogart makes very good arguments why the NBRC recommendations fail to provide much guidance. He is correct that the
trustee's acts to nonbeneficiaries ought to be protected by derived
judicial immunity as long as the acts are taken within the scope of
the trustee's duties. The trustee's duties to beneficiaries ought to be
delineated into a duty of care and duty of loyalty, but here Bogart
is wrong with respect to his analysis of a Chapter 11 trustee. They
should be governed by a uniform standard modeled on the duties of
a corporate director.

155.
156.
157.
158.

Bogart, supra note 135, at 740.
Id. at 741.
Id.
See id. at 726-27.
[Ylou will see that there is good reason not to place into statute even these
modest differences between Chapter 7 and Chapter 11 standards of care. The
reason is simple: Chapter 7 trustees are occasionally forced to run ongoing
business in hopes of selling them whole during bankruptcy, and conversely,
Chapter 11 trustees often liquidate parts, and perhaps even all, of the debtor's
estate.... It should not matter what Chapter the trustee finds himself in.
Rather, it is the nature of the debtors estate and business that determines
what we mean by 'care:"
Id.; see also DiStefano v. Stern (In re J.F.D. Enters., Inc.), 223 B.R. 610, 628 & n.25 (Bankr.
D. Mass. 1998), affd, 236 B.R. 112 (D. Mass. 1999), affd, 215 F.3d 1312 (1st Cir. 2000).
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CHAPTER 11 TRUSTEE AS A CORPORATE FIDUCIARY

Although trustees in Chapter 7 or 11 can be involved in the
aspects of both liquidating and running a company,'59 this fact blurs
the distinction between the two Chapters of the Code. Chapter
11, as the title explicitly states, is about "reorganization," not
"liquidation." 60 Because the purpose of the trustee is different, at
least in theory, between Chapter 11 and any other chapter, it
behooves one to view the standard of care in light of the principles
of reorganizing and running a business. Contrary to the opinions of
Bogart and others, this Note asserts that having the Chapter 11
trustees governed by the same standards of care as a corporate
director would be the best way to effectuate the policy goals of not
creating disincentives to serve as trustee but also not allowing the
trustee to mismanage the estate. The drafters of the NBRC
proposal might have had this in mind when they declined to assign
Chapter 11 trustees the same standard of care as the other
bankruptcy trustees. The NBRC, however, failed to create a viable
solution, as Bogart aptly points out.'
The general standard for directors as set out by the Model
Business Corporation Act provides excellent guidance for crafting
a uniform, national standard for Chapter 11 trustees. The duty of
care for a corporate director under this Act is defined as acting "(1)
in good faith; (2) with the care an ordinarily prudent person in a
like position would exercise under similar circumstances; and (3) in
a manner he reasonably believes to be in the best interests of the
corporation." 62 Bogart worried that a directive like this would not
make trustees accountable enough as a trustee, but this is not true.
When a trustee doeg not act in good faith, it is tantamount to a
breach of the duty of loyalty. As in corporate law, a breach of loyalty
is never protected by the business judgment rule because this is not
6
an act of negligence but of deliberate, intentional self-interest. 1
159. See Bogart, supra note 135, at 726-27.
160. 11 U.S.C. (2000).
161. See Bogart, supra note 135.
162. MODEL BuS. CORP. ACT § 8.30 (1984).

163. See, e.g., Bayer v. Beran, 49 N.Y.S.2d 2, 6 (Sup. Ct. 1944) ("The 'business judgment
rule,' however, yields to the rule of undivided loyalty. This great rule of law is designed to
avoid the possibility of fraud and to avoid the temptation of self-interest.'") (citation omitted).
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Furthermore, by asking the trustee to make decisions like any other
prudent trustee would make in similar circumstances, the trustee
would have the freedom under the business judgment rule to make
tough decisions without the repercussions of being personally sued.
Because the Chapter 11 trustee is attempting to resurrect a
troubled business, the courts should give great latitude to the
trustee as long as he serves the dual interests of managing the
estate and protecting the assets for the parties in interest. The
business judgment rule, as'modified for a Chapter 11 bankruptcy
trustee, best achieves this purpose. Because there is no exculpatory
clause written into this standard, trustees still will be obligated to
make informed, reasonable decisions. 4
CONCLUSION

The standard of care for a Chapter 11 trustee has been
misunderstood and misapplied. Bankruptcy trustees have only
fiduciary duties to the beneficiaries of the estate, and thus, should
be personally protected by derived judicial immunity for any suits
brought by nonbeneficiaries. As for beneficiaries, like any other
fiduciary, the Chapter 11 trustee owes the duties of care and
loyalty. Rather than the "gross negligence" and "willful and
deliberate" standards, the same duties as a "model" corporate
director should be used. The business judgment rule will insulate
the trustee enough so that there will not be a disincentive to run a
business, but the necessity of an informed and reasonably prudent
trustee will make sure that the interests of the estate are
adequately served.
David P. Primack

164. See, e.g., Smith v. Van Gorkom, 488 A.2d 858 (Del. 1985).

